to make some village in india -- >> established in 1984, dedicated to helping prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict abroad. in today's world this mandate means that not only do we address active conflicts, but also that we help to establish and maintain mechanisms and tools that increase stability and prevent future conflict. we are pleased to have the opportunity this afternoon to explore one such potential mechanism, their growing political and security partnerships between the nato and its partner countries in the

indo pacific, australia, japan, the republic of korea, and new zealand. this topic is subject of a new report that a u.s. ip expert study group has just issued, it is available online and we have hard copies outside for all of you. my main role is to welcome two of the most respected gentleman in washington. secretary of state dr. kurt campbell, and former national security advisor and firmer chair -- former chair stephen hadley. following their discussion, we are delighted to welcome a number of colleagues that will be a part of the panel. secretary of state douglas jones, senior advisor for east asian and pacific affairs elliott laskowski, former nato assistant john, and chair of the

u.s. ip study group on nato and indo pacific partners. the washington summit in july will mark the third year in a row that the leaders of australia, japan, new zealand, and the republic of korea joined nato counterparts and an alliance summit. a lot to talk about. a lot at stake in these discussions. including the return of strategic competition to the international system. threats to the world's based international order from the war in ukraine, a more assertive china. urgent transnational problems including climate change and emerging disruptive technologies. as the nato alliance enters its 75th year, this is faster than could have been imagined in the first nato

meeting in 1949. our aim is to talk about these challenges and how they can be addressed with new partnerships that are focused on deterrence, and interoperability and can also be addressed through cooperation and goodwill. those are the basis of our our stability. we invite you to the floor. [applause] >> thank you very much for being with us, we will have a conversation here for maybe a 20 or 30 minutes and then we will depart and we will invite the panelists to come up, two part two will be a discussion with analysts. i recommend all of you pick up as you leave if you have not gotten it already, it is a great job. i will start and give you a

business off ball on this one. it is an opportunity to say what you think we need to hear. 75 years ago no one could have imagined that an integrated european union or european state, let alone the president of the republic of korea and the prime ministers of australia, japan, and new zealand would be joining nato member states for regular summit meetings. yet that is what is now occurring. how do we get there? how should we feel about it? >> first, let me take a moment to say thank you for the invite, to help commemorate the report that has been issued, i want to thank you and your team. you have a great panel including doug jones, this english to members of your team, and her other colleagues -- distinguished members of your team.

i have never been this part of the, this is some of the most integrated architecture i've ever seen. we have been scouting around washington where we might hold the ip for and i think we have found our sites. we are thrilled it is magnificent and these are sincere. grateful to do anything with steve hadley, i do not think there is a person who has done more in the bipartisan context to support american purpose. when you look at the people that is building dedicated work, people like steve that helped propel national purpose in many important ways. as we get started, i am deeply focused on the upcoming summit,

this is an opportunity for us to both take stock and also look into the future, i do not think anyone could have imagined 75 years ago, if you look at all of the things that have been accomplished over this time, the first victory in the cold war, a return of conflict, terrible conflict. on the continent of europe. inclusion of new members that no one would have ever thought would have met the sort of terms of membership. a recognition that security and other issues transcend the simple geographic boundaries of europe. i think the fact that countries in the indo pacific have expressed interest in a focus on nato as an organization and member states in terms of the core admissions and understanding this information, larger sort of challenges

strategically, i think it is important. i will also say that i think in the past we have always thought about how countries in europe focus on the indo pacific and we either with the united states or it is interesting that the most decisive expression of the linkages that is now emerging between the indo pacific and europe around the other direction. it is the countries of the indo pacific and japan, south korea, australia, new zealand, singapore, and others, decisively got behind support for ukraine and have made consistent messaging of the importance of prevailing. two years ago, when president biden hosted the prime minister of japan and he spoke to a joint session of congress people on the hill were a little surprised that virtually the first thing that the prime minister raised

was the essential struggle we are focused on. victory or avoiding defeat was essential prerequisite for maintaining peace in the you know pacific. i think he and other leaders in the indo pacific recognize the interconnectivity between the two distinct regions. we are combined by many other things and there is a sense that common purposes and common approaches to global security overcome simple geographic differences and i will say that what we have also seen over the course of the last few years is a pressure that is bolstered by partnership with both china and north korea in ways that are antithetical not only to our

security interests in europe, but also the indo pacific. host: this relationship between nato and nato countries, this is pretty popular in washington and it reflects the consensus we have had and we have to get serious about the challenges presented by china. i want to ask a couple of questions and poke a little bit at that, one of the questions i would begin with is how has china reacted to this increasing cooperation between nato and are indo pacific friends and allies -- in our in the pacific friends and allies? >> it is incumbent on us to tell our stories carefully and explain what our purposes are and what they are not. we are not proposing that nato explore out of areas of

contingencies in the indo pacific that is far from what we believe. we also think it is critical that countries in the indo pacific understand exactly what the nature of our conversations are about. the limitations of what is being discussed. for instance there are important member state relationships with the nato and our interactions more generally, there is no real opposition of some combining forces that would integrate countries in the indo pacific into some formal self-defense article five article nine structure and nato. that is not what is being discussed or articulated. i think it is fair to say that china and russia have for years

not recently, but for years had a drumbeat of very negative information. we spent a lot of hours putting this microphone on and it does not work, a wonderful building but we still need to work on the technology. i would say that is a joke. it is ok, it is fine, it is a good technology. virtually any move that the united states or other countries thought to make on the security side of the indo pacific was labeled like the importation of nato into the indo pacific and specific ways. the information space has been very effectively played by chinese and russian disinformation. as you travel around the pacific

and southeast asia, you will offer your questions about nato ambitions, what are you doing in the indo pacific? part of the reasons i am so pleased by this report on the work it will underscore is that we do have to tell our story better and we have to explain clearly first of all, the critical role. seeing over the last seven years, focusing on the distance, it would be nato. in truth, it is a case study of how countries can work together to solve problems. all of the challenges they have faced. they have overcome over decades, even during periods where people thought that the west was in decline or would collapse. i think that these partnerships will be important, they help countries understand how to help

take security interests seriously. some of the initial discussions are around this information and they are around cyber related issues, they are around narratives that are negative like what we are confronting with respect to how nato is depicted in indo pacific countries. i think the summit gives us the opportunity to feature how these four responsible members of the independent states, and all of them, but south korea, japan -- excuse me, australia and new zealand, how these four states have played such an responsible role in not only securing the region, but the leaders of the countries desire to play an increasingly global role. when we say global world, that had often meant in the global

south but what we are seeing increasingly is responsibility voices -- responsible voices indicating that the links within southeast asia and europe are tight, important, and should be furthered. one of the things that is important, we talked about this, i worked on the indo pacific for a long period of time when i was in the obama administration, there was something that emerged called the pivot. or the rebalance. i have said this before but most initiatives that you launch in government, they disappear almost immediately without anyone noticing, they are like i do not even know what you are talking about. on the rare occasions when you do something that takes off, you are left with a different set of challenges which are how do you deal with the unintended consequences of an initiative you let out?

the most important consequence of this was a sense that somehow we were pivoting away from europe. to the indo pacific. that was a serious mistake and in fact, completely contrary to our interests and our desires. everything the united states has ever done of barbers on the global stage we have done with europe and i expect that will be the case as we go forward. it is also the case as we looked and thought about the indo pacific strategy, i am proud to say that one of the most important features of that is not just advancing partnerships and engagement with the indo pacific, but with europe. dramatic dialogues, some countries almost one dozen interactions in which we explore joint issues and engage in the past with we talked about a country in europe's indo pacific strategy that was largely how they thought about china.

what we are seeing in europe is a broad interest in the region and a whole as advancing with japan with south korea and thinking about engaging india and yes, how to have a responsible relationship with china as well. host: let me come back and ask you this question, when you have had interactions with china, what do you say to them when they say these increased relationships between nato and the allies is part of an effort to encircle china and constrain china to keep china down and what do you say to that question? to some critics here, they say that by emphasizing a renewed relationship between nato and the countries in asia, and our own pressure on countries to do

more for their defense, we are going to get a further chinese military buildup of the conventional forces and their nuclear forces? we are creating a security challenge that we would like to avoid. what you say to the chinese and others? >> we often hear from chinese friends about how the united states is taking this triangle are undermining commercially for economically surrounding china. i think it is important to take a moment and to provide a little bit of context before we depart on this question. if you look at the last 40 or 50 years, you could make an argument that these are the best 40 or 50 years in china's history, lifting billions of people out of poverty, you have to credit the ingenuity and

effectiveness of the chinese people. it is undoubtably the case that they accomplished this with the help of countries in the international system. probably no country has helped more than the united states, open markets, investments, support for 20 international institutions, highly debatable now, also, it is the maintenance and stability of the united states in the indo pacific for decades. these have provided in many respects the conditions that have allowed china to rise, thrive, and to develop more generally. i would largely answer directly to chinese friends that i do not see the actions that the west or the united states and europe has taken as somehow initiating chinese responses on the nuclear or military side. i think many of those plans were already well underway.

advanced at the time that i think sometimes reluctantly, and slowly, by groups in the west recognize that it was in our own best interest to work together to confront and engage on challenges that were opposing severe threats and concerns to our mutual security and prosperity. i would say that -- and i tried to explain to chinese friends much of what we have done is not designed to thwart china directly, it is designed to preserve and protect the institutions and the capabilities, the hard-won operating system we have developed together. i would also say that i even hear from chinese interlocutors quietly when we press them on their relationship with russia i

will say look at the partners you are choosing, the partners that you chose to propel yourself on the international states with, the other southeast asian countries. you have now pivoted to work most closely with russia, with north korea, increasingly with a lot with iran. that sends a signal on the global stage that is concerning not just in washington, but across capitals in europe as well. host: clearly, if nato started signing up as members, australia , new zealand, japan, and south korea, it would be a red flag to china. what about the argument that some have made that nato being the most successful military alliance in history? we should not bring nato into the indo pacific but we should create if you will a nato

look-alike in the indo pacific, pulling together our friends and allies in a more structured, self-defense arrangement, nato like? what would china's reaction be to that and what would be the reaction of our friends and allies? >> i think what we have tried to do over the course of the administration is building on bipartisan efforts for some time. the defense and security architecture in asia is quite different than the architecture in europe. i do not need to tell you this. multilateralism in asia is a live relatively new thing. -- is a relatively new thing. back in the 1990's, we were debating whether it was an american interest to support multilateral institutions in the region. they have now taken wing in many

respects, what we are seeing is the united states has a series of important bilateral relationships in the region and that a number of informal ties with other countries. i think the goal has been to not only diversify those links and bring new partners and, but to create crosscutting partnerships that are many lateral and purpose driven. able ambassadors to japan, the latticework arrangement in the indo pacific. the building blocks that we are seeking is not only to strengthen our bilateral relationships of the kind we have seen when the prime minister was here, we can just have all of you just take a moment to just to consider the

depth of the bilateral accomplishments, it is remarkable, an update of a 70-year-old relationship in a way that is completely unprecedented. we have added to the groupings, the quad, that brings all of the maritime major democracies in the indo pacific together, it seeks to provide nuclear power conventionally armed submarines and other elements that will hopefully over time integrate other like-minded countries in joint technological pursuits, important trilateral between the united states, japan, and south korea, bridging decades of serious divisiveness and most recently, steve, we can -- and we and a half ago between japan

and the philippines and the united states, we think these efforts along with strengthened bilateral relationships with those countries like vietnam increasingly like-minded on security issues and a major project that we are all engaged in which is trying to develop a stronger relationship with india. given its critical and central role on the global stage. these efforts together we believe provide a kind of security ballast. in the indo pacific, it will be sustaining and gives confidence and the member nations and helps provide the maintenance of peace and stability. i will also say that we believe and i think what you will see in july is that the ap for is now rising to the level of this kind of strategic initiative that will be integrated into the

other efforts that we are undertaking. host: you may have answered my question, but you have done a fantastic job about strengthening these bilateral relationships with individual countries. you have created a number of different architectures for different purposes and getting involved in not necessarily the same group of countries but there is a core group. all of that seems to be going extremely well, to be well received in the region and china's fussing is perceived nonetheless. the u.s. ip report talks about the ap for an ip for, some sensitivity in the region? there are differences among the core members, why, given your success on the bilateral relationships and all of these other institutions, why raise up

the ip 4 and institutionalize it? is that for the region you do not need given all of the great work you have done bilaterally and other mechanisms? host: it is an important question -->> it is an important question, launching anyone of these initiatives, we have faced challenges, domestic critics of the engagement between japan, south korea, and the united states, it has been criticized broadly in south korea and some concerns in japan. i did not mention the work we are doing in the pacific which has initially confronted with the concerns with the united states and the follow-through and whether we can be counted on for stable and steady presence in the region. we were once very important and largely departed from. i think even though in some of

the circumstances you sometimes confront early doubts and disagreements, it is important to both strategically formulate what you are seeking and what you think is in the best interests of the united states and other countries, advanced that, recognize that to be effective it is no longer important to just design something in an elegant structure and you have to get out and explain it. that is one of the reasons i am here today, to commend the work that the u.s. ip is doing which is remarkable and important if this is the first report of its kind that explores what the potential is. if i could say one last thing, it also suggests that for a lot of these initiatives that is the u.s. is the sole architect, nothing could be further from the truth. many of these initiatives are driven by strong-willed countries with their own

strategic sense. i would argue that 15 years ago no one would have said some of the biggest and most interesting strategic concepts that would be introduced on the global stage would come from japan. the indo pacific concept, the free and open concept was a powerful tool that helped synthesize how to think about the region promoted by the prime minister abe. the prime minister is focused along with the leaders of japan and south korea and australia and new zealand who are themselves promoting the idea of working more closely with european partners. i think it is incumbent on the united states to encourage that and shape that and to work in the best possible way with them. i also have to say this is a hard thing to be so direct

about, sometimes when a country is really unhappy with something, it can also mean you are on the right track. and so, sometimes we do get concerns and questions about the indo pacific strategies, i think that it might mean that we are doing some things more effectively than others might believe. steve: that is my last question, there is a lot going on in the region, you have described bilaterally with nato, european countries, how is it playing in their domestic politics? both of these governments in japan and south korea are under consideration and domestic pressure at home -- under considerable domestic pressure at home. is this contributing to that discontent and do we run the risk of undermining these governments and breaking their politics if we move too quickly? kurt: these are hard questions.

i do not think it should be lost on anyone that in many countries in europe and the indo pacific and the united states that we have leaders with challenged opinion polls. i think it is also the case that there is some disenchantment and anxiety with what democracy more in general can provide. i actually think one of the most important reasons why this is so important and i have seen it personally. i know and you have too, you are much more close, the burdens that are senior leaders feel, the weight of history. sometimes the ability to sit down and work in common purpose with other democratic partners is deeply reassuring and confidence. providing and provoking.

actually believe one of the most important things that countries can do when they face domestic challenges is to recognize and take purpose and courage and strength from gathering with others. it is undeniable that in the indo pacific, it is hard to sometimes make the argument about why art of various thinking, it is complicated. i would simply say that this is not unique to japan and south korea. if you look at the debate that occurred here on capitol hill over the weekend and on friday. you saw very clear voices arguing that it is not an american interest to be spending so much time and to be focused on other people's problems. i believe we are best able to

confront those nationalist impulses when we work collectively and effectively together. i also say that the prime minister of japan, others, prime ministers, when they left washington after what i would considered -- we have done the quad in terms of state visits, each of them saw the substantial bumps in their popularity, substantial. working with the united states is still important and popular even in highly contested domestic circumstances. stephen: we have come to the end of the time for this first portion of the program, i am sorry we did not have time for audience q&a, we were trying to pack a lot into this time. i apologize for that. we are hoping you will stay tuned, he will depart we will bring the panel up and we will talk about this terrific part.

you and in thanking kurt campbell. -- join me in a kurt campbell. [applause] kurt: i hope you have the opportunity to engage on this report and i want to encourage everyone to take a look at it, thank you for pointing it out and it touches on all of the issues honestly that we are confronting. i would tell you even though we are going to face some headwinds on this, we will press ahead. stephen: thank you so much for being with us. let me invite the panelists to come and come to the stage and we will continue this discussion.

we have already introduced the panelists. i will tell you a bit more about them and i think you will conclude we could not have a better group. i will start with mary, at the end, she was the chair of the u.s. ip expert study group, they produce the report that is on the table outside. she is the u.s. ip senior policy analyst for china and east asia, she has worked across the state and the senate and in the united nations, well traveled her career. doug jones is the deputy assistant secretary of state for the european and eurasian affairs, overseas european issues in security including nato, conventional arms control, and security.

from 2018 to 2021 he served as the deputy chief at nato. thank you for being with us. next the senior advisor and the bureau of east asian and pacific affairs, her areas of focus include nato's partners, the previous posts and the department of state, policy planning, and the german marshall fund. last but not least, john manta, served as a new assistant secretary general for operations through 2018 through 2022 and his responsibility includes plans and capacity building with partner nations. he serves as the executive director of the haiti interagency working group, the office of the secretary of

defense, and it will keep you busy for some time. i want to thank the panelists for all coming and joining us this afternoon and i would like to begin with myrna and ask her to summarize the report. i hope you all take a copy and read it, what are they going to find and what you think is going to surprise them that they may not have known? myrna: thank you. in addition to the report, coming off of the study, the president's opening remarks, we were interested in the potential of nato and the pacific partner relations and the mechanisms in asia. we understood the countries on relations with nato and on the interests from leaders. we had a fantastic group of experts and four nato ally

countries and each of these folks had focused before on their relations with nato or nato relations with the indo pacific and members who are experts on this issue, we were lucky to get the right folks in the room. they were a joy to work with, we started out with the right people and that set the tone for our ability to go where we went eventually. when the report looked at the issues, and national level interests in nato we looked at four main areas. we look at the history of nato's engagement with the region and regional partners and only bilaterally but also as a group of four which we have mentioned how various names we are calling in the report the ip for the indo pacific four. we look at certain issues, one of them was expectations of nato in the region, another one was used on nato and china in the final one was views on the nato

in ukraine. the third report looks into how these partners see themselves as being grouped into the ip four. when they think the potential is. we looked at public diplomacy and strategic messaging on relations between nato and these partner countries. the group made some observations and outlined policy options in each of these areas which i will only briefly go through. that is why you have the report available to you and we hope you will take a look at it. in terms of nato in the region, the alliance has a long history of engaging with its partners in the region. one that precedes the nato recognition of china as a potential security challenge would only happen in 2019 but if you go back to when these partners started their partnership agreements in the late 2010s, for the two decades if you go back to the beginning of nato's engagement with japan and the countries cooperating

with nato's mission in afghanistan. nato carried out three consecutive counter piracy missions in the indian ocean between 2009 and 2016 which was welcomed by regional countries including china. it is important to kind of keep the history in mind because nato or china is painting nato's interest in the region as a foreign and unfairly all about china. if you look at the history, this is not accurate. on the trends among the partner countries, i will pull out the most interesting ones. on nato in the region, none of the partner countries expect nato to be a significant direct actor on the indo pacific. what they want is the alliance to coordinate with them on issues of new mutual concern -- of mutual concern affecting the region. they want to work with nato, not

for nato. they want to participate with relevant discussions on china but none want the corporation to be characterized to be about china. on the question of ukraine, this is the area where the four countries are the closest in terms of position. all of them are very concerned about russia's wa and all of them see asr -- -- war,, they see it as problematic and they see it necessary for the prosperity and security of europe. also because of the signal for aggregation it sends to china and north korea and all of them have placed sanctions on china and have helped with aid to ukraine. in terms of views from the countries on the ip 4 grouping,

from the first meeting of nato in 2020 two, partner country official strongly emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationships between nato in each of these countries. there remains a priority for those groups. the fact of the matter is that the ip four grouping has gained in prominence in the last couple of years and as a result of this, the countries understand how best to take advantage of the fact for their national and regional goals. we have discussed the benefits of the grouping and suggested these countries take a look at how they can take greater strategic advantage of being the ip 4 essentially. on public diplomacy and outreach to partner country, we need more of it. there is a relatively limited understanding of nato and public levels in all of the countries and even within policy circles

across countries. this is really important as kurt campbell mentioned because china is picking up negative messaging on nato in the region. the last area, the rationale for engagement, we want to clarify why these relations are important. given the strategic or changes stemming from russia -- from changes from russia's war in ukraine we looked at a strategic rationale for engagement that go beyond what we have traditionally had with partners in nato which has been very generally, the three we looked at focused on, one, the connection between nato and the regions that make them more relevant for one another's security than previously

perceived. second, we looked at the growing interdependence of deterrence dynamics in the indo pacific, with strategic competition between the u.s. and china. and third, we looked at the impact of strategic competition on transnational threats. for example, cybersecurity. in the context of geopolitical tensions between the major powers or nonproliferation but in the context of russia's saber rattling over ukraine, these cans of things. the group felt that more systemic discussions between nato and partners on these issues would improve each side's situational awareness" innate perceptions. -- and coordinate perceptions. maybe i will stop there. stephen: thank you very much. one of the things that surprised me before you started was the long-standing relations between nato and are close to security partners in the indo pacific, which i was not aware of. there is another sense in the report, there is a tone, and it

picks up on my question to kurt campbell, and it is a question i want to put to all members of the panel. there is a sense in which there is a certain fragility about the ip4 uncertain sensitivities in the region on some of the issues. the question i would have is from a u.s. perspective, nato- ip4 relations and the emerging role of the ip4, a fleeting trend or here to state? -- or here to stay? as kurt said, something we work on for a time and it becomes part of the fabric of the region. is it fleeting? are we seeing something that is here to stay? why do we start with you -- why don't we start with you?

>> thanks for having me here today. great hearing the report and i'm very honored to be joining. i think -- supporting what the deputy secretary said, but i don't disagree. this is not a fleeting moment. the fabric is here to stay. the point you touched on, going back over decades, looking at historical cooperation on important issues shows the foundation of these relationships. he touched earlier on the bilateral nature of the growth we see around the world come in transnational threats, the interconnectedness of one region to another, responding to these shared threats, areas of practical cooperation in the we

can touch on in a little bit. hyper threats, emerging threats that hybrid threats, -- hybrid threats, emerging threats. the cooperation will continue to deepen. >> so i agree with your main point, it is not fleeting. it is something that is for the long-term. and i think it is important that not only come as you said, it's not newcomb but the partnerships in the pacific -- we talk about it as if that is the only area where nato has deep partnerships, but nato concluded a long time ago, atlantic security is tied to security elsewhere in the world. nato has 35 partnerships around the world. it has partnerships in africa, partnerships in the middle east, formalized structure and the cooperation initiative.

what happens elsewhere impacts atlantic security and that is driving this relationship with pacific partners. our indo pacific partners are realizing that what is happening in the atlantic space is impacting them. this increasing realization that there are these interplays between what happens in the euro atlantic area and elsewhere is becoming more prominent. what is driving the increased focus on the indo pacific is, a, china is becoming more of a factor in a euro atlantic security, but also we are seeing more examples of how the security of ukraine being the most recent example driving this, as we have seen, how the

prc's support for russia economically and supporting the defense industrial base is impacting the war in ukraine. we are seeing how ammunition and missiles coming to the dprk is helping them prosecute the war in ukraine. and then on the flipside, the conclusion of what happens, the outcome of what happens in ukraine will deeply impact security in the indo pacific, and what conclusions the prc may raise if putin's invasion of ukraine is not defeat, it may have serious consequences in the indo-pacific. all those are strong basis of why we have the -- this dialogue and it is growing stronger. stephen: thanks very much, doug.

john, how do you see it? john: the cooperation until fairly recently was at a political come almost a token level. but that over time, especially with the rise of china and it now the world by forgetting into totalitarian states -- bifurcating into totalitarian states and democracies and democracies realizing the threat from china,, north korea, maybe put iran in that mix, i see this as increasingly important. it started in my mind in 20 in london, went fine -- 2019 in london when allies were finally able to get over the hump and talk about china in terms you here in washington and just recognize the threat from a rising china up until that point there was a lot of reticence on both sides in the

pacific rim and amongst allies. many allies do not want to discuss what was happening in the pacific rim as a threat to their own security. certainly ukraine has helped to foster that thinking. stephen: mirna, you want the last word? mirna: sure. stephen: you can use the handheld mic. mirna: the countries are is playing a prominent role in the region and that has to do a lot with their democraticness, strong militaries, strong economic performance, strong support of the rules-based international order, characteristics they share with nato allies. if anything, the question is not so much are hte ip4 pleading is are we going to see more countries that engage in the region.

they are being pursued by nato because of the kind of countries they are, and they are able to provide insight for our allies in europe into what is happening in the region. that is not replaceable by anyone else. i don't see these partners becoming less important anytime soon. stephen: thank you. john, i'm going to put a question to you that follows on something you said, which obviously one of the things that brought this relationship between nato and our indo pacific partners closer was concerns about china. how do you describe it, characterize it, frame it in such a way that it doesn't play into the narrative that this is about constraining, and circling, and keep -- encircling , keeping china down, that nato has a hidden agenda against the prc, and this is really all aimed at china?

how do you avoid playing into that narrative? that is the narrative that is good to make it more difficult for some countries to -- going to make it more difficult for some countries to work with nato and it is going to be an issue with the public. how do you describe this work in such a way that does not play into the chinese narrative? john: i think this is especially difficult because even in our own country, what is the percentage of americans who understand nato and the alliance and what it does? our relationships even bilaterally with nations abroad. to educate publics on this is very difficult. chinese leadership, you could certainly target -- doug hit a very strong point, this is not unusual, we have partnerships all over the world. and that is a good one to explain. it is good, as discussed before,

to talk about this is not new in the pacific. but i also think maybe we shouldn't hide it so much. we should be proud of democracies and standing together. we do that in europe all the time, across the north atlantic. we talk about being shoulder to shoulder with our allies to deal with threats to democracy. i know there is a risk of making the chinese feel isolated, but i also think in terms of deterrence and that message, we shouldn't hide it. we are proud of democracies supporting other democracies in the pacific rim. stephen: thank you. anyone else want to comment? doug, your next.-=-- you're next. douglas: i think maybe another way to talk about it is nato and indo-pacific partners and other partners are talking by dealing

with security challenges regardless of where they come from. this is not aimed at the prc, but we think challenges to our security from a lot of different sources -- as democracies that share a lot of common values, we see value in cooperating with them regardless of where the challenges come from. stephen: you want to say a word about the study groups on this issue? >> i think one of the quotes we have in the report, we were talking about the question of who said they don't like to see cooperation with nato characterized as being about china. there are many ways nato is cooperating in the region with these partners. talking about it as being something that is directed at china, on the first instance it is correct, and on the second

instance it plays into the chinese narrative of the asia-pacific, nato, you guys are moving into the region, this is going to sow instability. there is a lot we can do with these partners the region that, as doug said, touches on issues that cross regional boundaries. and at the same time having nato allies on the region is certainly helping to make these partners feel more security and feel as though people are paying attention to what is going on, which whether you intend into or not has a deterrent effect on china, which tends to have military adventurism. stephen: ellison, i will get your view on this question, but i will frame it in a different way and just ask how does the indo pacific region perceive nato at this point, and the indo-pacific partner relations.

and what is the u.s. government due to shape perceptions in the region? ellison: sure. taking a little bit of a step back and reflecting on what the deputy secretary said, the united states' view looking at this partnership and our engagement with the region, with these allies and partners in the region, it has been part of our strategy, consistent with the strategy, national security strategy, indo-pacific strategy, that deepening our engagement between allies and partners across the board to counter transnational challenges is at the core of this vision. doing so -- again, the deputy secretary touched on the idea of the latticework, we are committed to strengthening bilateral relations in the region, all of these things we

continue to do consistent with one another. the nato-indo-pacific partnership idea has been described as mini space lateral is him.-- minilateralism. many terms have been thrown out, but at its core it is about bringing together partners to address concerns and this is consistent with that idea. the other piece that i would say that's been touched on a little bit here is we do need to do a better job, more consistent job messaging. it is incumbent on all of us to strengthen our public messaging in the region. we can talk about what this is and is not. at the same time, on the flipside, to counter the rampant disinformation we have talked about today. stephen: the very old the geometries, different groups of

countries, the purpose for which the group is pulled together, the subjects they deal with, is a very resilient structure over time, and makes it a difficult target to shoot at, quite frankly. doug, i have a question for you that was given to me and i want to put on the table -- is the nato office in tokyo still under consideration? would such an office affect the balance of power in the indo-pacific region, or would it change the nature of nato? can i ask you that question without breaching -- douglas: no, you can ask me that question. not talking actively -- stephen: it is not? douglas: not actively being discussed to start the alliance in tokyo. it was blown way out of proportion in any case.

an office at the u.n., african union. it's our standard way we can increase partnerships and dialogue. certainly no to the other two questions, this would not transform nato for the balance of power. i think a lot was made out of something that would be a way for us to have a mechanism to increase the dialogue already existing that wouldn't symbolize any change in nato's posture or approach. stephen: one thing i take from this conversation that is useful, and a great answer to the china question, nato has relations globally, you are saying, because it uses security threats from a variety of different directions, particularly transnational threats. this is of a piece with where

nato has gone given the security situation challenges it has faced. i think if you can frame it in that context, and makes it easier to answer the question, is this all about holding down china. it's useful if you at that point. -- add that point. i want to pause for a minute. we have a number of folks online and we said we would give similar questions -- some of the questions online to the panelists. do we have some? thank you so much. can the panelists responded to how nato might respond to other issues asia-pacific faces like north korea, terrorist groups, and more? who would like to take that one on? i'll have to draft somebody. [laughter] john: i could jump in.

doug would probably back me up. the level of nato's involvement in the pacific region is something that would be determined by all allies collectively. when we make decisions by consensus, i think that would limit the scale and scope of involvement as in that question. it doesn't mean individual allies won't get along or carry out various actions in the region. and one of the real strengths is that these issues, even if they are from faraway places like the dprk, are discussed in the north atlantic council. any threat to nato territory or just issues of grave concern around the world are discussed almost every single day in the north atlantic council by all the members. stephen: has there been a discussion of north korea per se

in the north atlantic -- nato atlantic -- north atlantic council -- have there been discussions of north korea in the nac, and it is -- is it a subject nato has talked about? mirna: this is an interesting point because when we look at the history of nato partners with a group, it is north korea that spurs the first meeting of nato with ip4. that is in 2016, before nato becomes interested in china as a security threat. i can't remember the exact date, but basically since x year, the north atlantic council has issued regulatory treatment on north korea north korea has appeared in the declarations of nato's summit meetings regularly. so yes, nato things a lot about north korea and has talked to partners but north korea. stephen: i have a second

question online and i will give a little context. there has been discussion over the years whether the perception of europe in the united states about the china challenge is the same. i think there was a lot of people who think there has been convergence, but there has been some progress there. this question is the following -- what strategies is the u.s. considering to navigate the competition with china while maintaining the cohesion and cooperation within nato? ellison, you want to take that one on? ellison: in a roundabout way, thinking about the question specifically, but let me piggyback on the last question and i will try to come around. i do think -- we touched on this a little bit here, but i think it is important to remember that

these conversations, important conversations about security on any topic, i do think we have a growing list of topics that are rife for practical cooperation and further collaboration, cooperation, going in both directions, atlantic, pacific. but these are happening in other channels as well. we are specifically talking about nato conversations, but this is the bread-and-butter of a lot of conversations in different channels. i guess i would touch on my response to the second question -- forgetting the second piece of it, but how we think about the broader context and conversation with which we are addressing these in a variety of forums. stephen: i have a final question here and then we will go to the audience for questions.

sounds technical, but i think it's important -- john, this may be for you, and mirna, you talked about it in the study -- nato sent observers to the 2022 bilateral military exercise between japan and the united states. australia participated. south korea, new zealand, several nato member states and regional countries were invited to observe. will will likely see more nato observers of regional exercises in the indo-pacific in the future, and will we see nato- flagged exercises in the pacific anytime soon, nato-sponsored exercises in the indo-pacific? is that an evolution we are moving toward? john, you want to start, and mirna, you want to comment? john: the last question about nato-flagged exercises, i don't

see that anytime soon. you have to get all 32 members of the alliance to approve something like that. there are some allies who are just hesitant to show the native flag in the pacific rim. but you know, i hope that they continue to visit exercises and i have exchanges on a host of things many comes to war fighting -- when it comes to war fighting in particular, because i come from just recently being a professor at a war college. the character of war is changing so rapidly, and a lot of that is being driven by china. i would think these western nations, all democracies around the world, should be learning from each other as much as

possible, and this should be one of our greatest strengths, our ability to interact and share information, techniques and procedures, what equipment each nation is developing, figure out how to best use all that in order to deter and protect our countries. maybe not flagged exercises, but learning from each other and certainly those nations in particular australia, they come and observe many exercises in europe. when i was assistant secretary, they were very integrated. stephen: did the study group look into this issue? mirna: couldn't possibly answer the question better than john. stephen: i think that concludes the conversation up here.

i think we should go to the audience. if you raise your hand, we have microphones that will come your way. these introduce yourself and ask -- please introduce yourself and ask your question, and you can address a specific member of the panel, or jump ball and somebody will grab it. >> hello, senior associate for korea research at the wilson center. i returned from tokyo where we had conversations about nato, so thank you for this excellent and timely event. i would like to go back to one of the comments made earlier by the deputy secretary about multilateralism and m ini-lateral we talk about it a bunch, but particularly the trilateral space, the u.s.-korea-japan trilateral space, i'm curious how that trilateralism might be encouraged through the ip4. and maybe a follow-up question,

down the road, are there ways to institutionalize this partnership and relationship what tangibly as-- more tangibly as we move forward and was spaces as well? mirna: i can take the first bite i did. to your first question, my answer is very simple, and it literally talks to this concept using latticework. the idea that you can do this thing with your hands. you're connecting -- your connecting partners, the overlapping circles, whether around substance come around issues, configuration itself, but the idea is you are covering in a nimble way a variety of circumstances that come up. in a sense, getting to your second question, developing and weaving the fabric, bringing another analogy that is making got stronger for the future going forward. the other piece of your second question that i alluded to

earlier is the deepening of the bilateral relationships that are at the heart of these trilateral, other groupings. as the deputy secretary said, we talk a lot about nato in the indo-pacific, but i would highlight the strength of those relationships going the other way as well, and the outreach and engagement that we see from the indo pacific, tokyo, se oul, canberra, with capitals in europe, nato, the bilateral level. could keep the analogy going all day, but the bindings are getting tighter and tighter. >> asia-pacific at the hudson institute. thanki you so much for a great presentation and great program today, grateful for it. what else can be done on the road to the natosummit to ensure

that this summit is not upended by events in ukraine -- fortunately the aid package passed. what else can be done to ensure that this summit is not a fleeting moment, but is part of an emerging trend in international security that these four countries are contributing and working closely with nato in the future? stephen: who would like to start? doug? douglas: my turn? i think there is a lot we can do. summits are a point for the alliance that we chart the way forward, so we should be charting the next steps. also with the indo-pacific partnerships, i think that probably looks less like some formalizing of it and more about us trying to find ways where we might be able to enhance the cooperation that exists.

-- so a lot of what we do with our indo-pacific partners right now is really just talk to each other, exchanging information, lessons learned, despite all the hoopla. i think we are starting to look at ways that we might advance that into actual corporation, things like i think we are talking about having them participate, for example, on an ai technology board, make contributions to the dialogue going on in nato and benefit from it themselves as well. stephen: john, do you want to add anything to that? john: i think as doug said, these summits sometimes called the alliance to turn in a certain direction after the shock. in our time there, the race for islamic state, for example, because nato and the worst to

turn in a certain direction and ukraine falls into that category. in many ways, in this summit, it will be more of a continuation of work to solidify the industrial base, to make sure that allies and partners are producing the weapons systems that they should to defend themselves. the steady rise in defense spending, i think, is something that may be will be solidified in the summit. but having worked with there, and we have all gotten through the pain of negotiating these documents, you know, it all presses against what the market will bear, what the allies are willing to do in consensus. so i think, just a continuation of strengthening resolved to defend is what you will see. stephen: ellison?

ellison: it also highlights a message of opportunity for us to get the message out, reinforce the language in the official documents themselves, and reinforce that we are building on something. that this will be the third consecutive. i think it is an opportunity that we seek to take advantage of. stephen: any questions? ian, you have got to have a question over there. i know you too well. [laughter] >> thanks. from the atlantic council. as the united states and europe works towards a more common approach to their shared interests in the indo-pacific, you would think a strategy should have multiple elements, an economic dimension, ecological dimension and perhaps a military dimension. what do you envision that military dimension including? and is there a role for it in

nato, particularly in light of the fact that many of our european allies actually contribute forces and have a very active presence in the indo-pacific. it may not be huge, but it is there. so it makes imminent sense to me as part of a comprehensive strategy towards our interests in the indo-pacific, there are to be a more robust military dimension. nato would be the natural home for it. maybe we ought to be thinking more aggressively, more ambitiously when it comes down to leveraging the capabilities needed can bring to the region in terms of military exercises and such. panelist: it's almost like he is reading my talking points from a couple of years ago. [laughs] a. cooperation in the field, and at sea is invaluable. as for a former military guy, as the marine infantry officer, i will tell you, when you operate with another country, you

learned so much. when you see their forces in action, you develop relationships that last for years, for decades just by training with them. you see equipment and how they are using it. it all goes back to capital and helps foster this political will even above the military levels to do more. so, absolutely. even though i say i think if you will see nato flagged exercises there, certainly the community and nato can and should foster a more direct cooperation, more exercises together, sharing technology and best practices, more working together. stephen: before we go to our next question, does anybody have anything to add? i have two more online. one is from harrison who asks, "how is the nato and the ip4

looking at a rise in sino-russian relations when it comes to the arctic?" douglas: it is in part of my portfolio. i will say first of all, there has been a big change in nature with finland and sweden joining. with those two arctic nations in nato, seven of the eight arctic nations in the world our nato allies. when there is a lot more nato in the arctic. so there is naturally more overfocus on arctic and arctic security in nato. and we are watching very closely -- well, first, russia as russia has built up its military infrastructure in the arctic and increased its presence. and we are seeing signs of increased cooperation between

russia and china, seeing them exercise jointly off of the coast of alaska, we have seen a maritime exercises and we have seen them operating increasingly in the arctic. and so that is a major area of concern because i think we still have the ambition to keep conflict and tension low in the arctic. it is concerning with the increased militarization from russia and as russia is sort of in a disadvantage, as russia basically is weaker and needs china more, there is a risk that they feel that arctic is one place they can give more in terms of access to the arctic. that would be something that would be a concern to all of us. i think nato is watching that closely.

secondly, there is more of an imperative for a force that turns to defense in the arctic right now given what we have seen. i think there is something you will see need respond to. stephen: this next one, i think, ellison, is coming your way. one of nato's members, hungary, signed the security agreement with china. what impact could such an agreement have on nato and allies? ellison: i think i could punt some of this dog's way, but understanding the complexity of -- i could punt this doug's way, but understanding the complexity of this, and we have seen this play out in different issues. there are bilateral pieces, things we have discussed around

the board, so i don't think in this context, the answer is any different. maybe there is an institutional piece. douglas: i have to say i am not familiar with that particular agreement so it is hard for me to comment on it. but just to say, you know, nato per se can't direct to its member states what to do with their approach to china. we use it as a place where we can share our views and make our assessments clear. i think you have seen a real convergence in recent years mainly with the much heightened awareness in europe on the challenges posed by economic policies and the need to build

collective resilience to those. obviously, different nations may take a different approach to that. i think collectively we have seen a seachange in europe and a much closer alignment with the united states. stephen: any other questions from the audience? alright, we will give you five minutes back on your day. i want to thank you for the report. mirn and will give you thea last word. anything you would like to say? mirna: sure. first of all, thank you so much to our panelists, you have made the event much more interesting. we can just have nick talking about the report. [laughs] we do encourage everyone to look at the report, there is a lot more detail there and it is something that i think it would take towards the summit, it will be in the minds of policymakers,

it is certainly on the minds of our ip4 partners. don't forget that these relations continue to and continue to be important, and watch this space. stephen: so let me thank you all for coming and participating in this event. please join me in thanking our panelists. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2024] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy, visit ncicap.org]